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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court in 
and for Utah County. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-28-3(2)(j), this matter having been poured over from the 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented to the Court of Appeals are: 
1. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the Plaintiffs' action with 
prejudice for their failure to return the earnest money prior to filing suit as required 
by the purchase contract. The standard of review is correctness. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Plaintiffs' claim of 
waiver does not apply, and whether there exists any factual basis to the Plaintiffs' 
claim that the Defendants failed to raise or stipulated to waive their defense of failure 
to return the earnest money prior to suit. 
1 
3. Whether the Court committed clear error by improperly using its 
"equitable powers" to order return of the earnest money to Plaintiffs or reduce the 
attorneys fees to Defendants. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)G) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a lawsuit arising from a Real Estate Purchase Contract. After the sale 
failed, the sellers kept the earnest money and filed suit for specific performance and 
damages. The Plaintiffs returned an equivalent amount to the Defendants shortly 
before trial. The matter proceeded to trial and, at the close of the Plaintiffs' case, the 
Defendants moved for dismissal for the Plaintiffs' failure to return the earnest money 
prior to suit. The Court granted the motion but ordered the earnest money given back 
to the Plaintiffs and awarded Defendants a reduced amount of attorneys fees. This 
appeal followed. The following facts are relevant to the issues presented. 
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1. On or about October 25, 1999, the parties entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract for the sale of Plaintiff s home to Defendants. Incident to the 
contract, Defendants paid Plaintiffs $2,500.00 earnest money. (R. 471) 
2. The Defendants, as buyers, invoked the appraisal condition which 
provided that if the property appraised for less than the purchase price, the buyer may 
cancel the contract by providing written notice. (R. 174) 
3. On December 3, 1999, the buyers notified the sellers that the appraisal 
they provided contained many errors, some of them quite serious, and that they were 
moving forward to hire an appraiser. (Defendants' Exhibit 31) 
4. On December 6, 1999, the Defendants gave notice that the appraisal 
condition was not met and the buyers elected not to complete the transaction. 
Defendants demanded the return of the earnest money. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7, R. 470) 
5. On December 2,1999, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the Defendants 
seeking specific performance, damages and extraordinary writs. (R. 1-67) 
6. Plaintiffs did not return the earnest money to Defendants prior to filing 
suit or pursuing any other remedy. (R. 470) 
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7. On February 16, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Deposit Earnest 
Money into Court. (R. 80) 
8. On March 6, 2000, the Defendants filed an Answer, and in the Fourth 
Defense reserved the right to raise any additional defenses or affirmative defenses. 
(R. 87) 
9. On April 27, 2000, the Defendants filed an Opposition to Motion to 
Deposit Earnest Money into Court and went on record for the proposition that paying 
the earnest money into court does not constitute a return of the earnest money and 
that the Defendants had elected their remedy of liquidated damages and forfeited the 
right to specific performance. (R. 116) 
10. On May 19, 2000, the Plaintiff paid the sum of $2,500.00 to the 
Defendants and Defendants accepted the money. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, R. 470) 
11. The $2,500.00 was given to the Defendants by the Plaintiffs in an 
attempt to revive or preserve their claim for specific performance. (R. 470) 
12. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the following provisions 
providing for return of the earnest money: "If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either 
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to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue 
Buyer to specifically enforce this contract or pursue other remedies available at law.11 
(Paragraph 16,R.470) 
13. Plaintiffs presented their case at trial on June 6, 2000, and August 29, 
2000. Plaintiffs rested their case on August 29, 2000. (R. 470) 
14. At the close of Plaintiffs' case, Defendants made a motion to dismiss 
based upon Plaintiffs' failure to return Defendant's earnest money before filing suit. 
(R. 470) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The case was properly dismissed for the Plaintiffs' failure to return the earnest 
money when the Plaintiffs considered the Defendants to be in default prior to filing 
suit. The lower court followed a line of cases in Utah that uniformly hold to the 
principle that a suit for specific performance or damages under a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract may not be pursued unless the earnest money is first returned to the buyer 
who the seller claims to be in default. If the earnest money is not returned, the seller 
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is deemed to have kept it as liquidated damages. This is not subject to waiver under 
these facts, and the record does not support the claim that the Defendants waived it. 
The Court committed clear error in ordering the Defendants to return the 
earnest money, since there was no finding that they were in default. The Court's use 
of its equitable powers was without adequate foundation. The Court also committed 
clear error in reducing the award of attorneys fees to the Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RETURN OF THE EARNEST MONEY IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT 
TO FILING SUIT 
The Defendants paid $2,500.00 as earnest money on a contract for the purchase 
of Plaintiffs' home. When the Plaintiffs later claimed that the Defendants had 
defaulted, they brought suit for specific performance and for damages, without first 
returning the earnest money as required by the contract. At the close of Plaintiffs' 
case, the Court dismissed the suit with prejudice, for failure to return the earnest 
money prior to suit. 
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It is clear that the Court below properly treated the return of the earnest money 
as a condition precedent to the filing of an action. The particular Real Estate 
Purchase Contract used by the parties in this transaction provided for a choice of 
remedies.1 In the event of a claim of buyer default, seller is provided with a choice 
to make. One alternative is a liquidated damage remedy, using the amount of the 
earnest money as the measure of the liquidated damages. The other alternative a non-
defaulting seller has against a defaulting buyer is to bring a lawsuit. The suit may 
either be to specifically enforce the contract or to pursue other legal remedies. In the 
suit, the seller is free to request either remedy or to plead for both in the alternative, 
however, the seller may not bring an action unless he first returns the earnest money. 
The Plaintiffs have couched this case in terms of an "election of remedies" 
case. In this analysis, the Plaintiffs are less than precise. The election of remedies 
doctrine would come into play only if the seller were able to file an action and had 
1
 Paragraph 16 reads, in part: 
If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the earnest money 
deposit as liquidated damages or to return it and sue buyer to 
specifically enforce this contract or pursue other remedies available at 
law. 
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plead for alternative remedies. At some point in such action, a seller would have to 
elect between specific performance, an equitable remedy, and damages, a legal 
remedy. At that point, the doctrine of election of remedies, as urged by the Plaintiffs, 
would come into play. 
The Plaintiffs' argument that their right to an election of remedy allows them 
to retain the earnest money and bring suit is a misinterpretation of the election of 
remedies doctrine and flies directly in the face of the contract language. The contract 
provides for only one of two alternative and inconsistent courses of action. One is 
that sellers may retain the earnest money and not pursue their dispute further. The 
other allows them to return the earnest money and sue for a further remedy. There 
is nothing in the plain contract language that allows a disappointed seller to do both. 
He cannot retain the earnest money and still sue. The only way to get to court is to 
first return the earnest money. Thus, the return of the earnest money becomes a 
condition precedent to filing a suit. A suit for specific performance or for damages 
that is filed prior to returning the earnest money must be dismissed. This is true even 
if the matter goes all the way to judgment, as will be demonstrated below. 
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There are five Utah cases that have addressed this question. All five have 
applied the same reasoning and all five have arrived at the same result. The cases are 
discussed below in chronological order. The trial court correctly applied the law of 
these cases. 
In Andreasen v. Hansen, 335 P.2d 404 (Utah 1959), Hansen entered into an 
Earnest Money Agreement with Andreason, an attorney, and paid $50.00 as earnest 
money. Hansen later backed out of the deal, leaving the $50.00 earnest money to be 
forfeited. Andreason retained the earnest money and brought suit for additional 
damages, pursuing the matter to judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment and left Andreason with only the $50.00 earnest money. 
Apparently Andreasons asserted at some point that they said they would not 
keep the earnest money as liquidated damages, but the Court ruled that: 
. . . their conduct must be regarded as speaking louder than their words. 
The fact is that the defendants' $50 was kept, and that there was no 
return nor tender of return of the money . . . The fact that the money 
was kept is incontrovertible evidence that the plaintiffs exercised the 
option to keep it. That being so, they must be deemed to have kept it for 
the purpose indicated in the contract, that is, as liquidated damages. 
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Henriod further explained the decision as 
follows: 
The buyers broke their promise and the sellers retained the amount 
advanced. In my opinion such retention constituted an exercise of the 
option and precluded the sellers from pursuing any other remedy. It is 
inconsistent for the sellers to insist on holding the buyers to the terms of 
the contract and at the same time retain the money that they agreed 
would be the measure of damages upon breach, if they retained it. Such 
inconsistency must be resolved against the sellers who not only 
furnished the printed contract, but who had the power of election. 
In the next case, McMullin v. Shimmin, 349 P.2d, 720 (Utah 1960) the suit was 
dismissed at pretrial for the same reason. Following the ruling and reasoning in 
Andreas on, the trial court did not even allow the case to proceed to trial. The 
Plaintiffs had never returned or offered to return the $100.00 earnest money. Four 
months after the contract failed, the plaintiff sued for specific performance and for 
damages. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal at the pretrial stage, ruling that 
the claim for damages was precluded by the failure to return the earnest money, 
limiting recovery to the amount of the earnest money deposit. 
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The Court ruled as follows: 
The only question as to whether such limit applies is whether or not the 
option has been exercised. Such option is exercised by retention of the 
down payment. The clause tells the parties that the seller need only to 
retain the sum to exercise his right to keep it. The Seller chooses the 
language. His retention becomes meaningful when he claims the buyer 
has breached the contract and refuses to go through with it. 
Under the facts here, it is obvious that the seller claimed a breach, and 
consequently the Andreason case seems determinative, wherein it was 
said that 'The fact that the money was kept is uncontrovertible evidence 
that the plaintiffs exercised the option to keep it.' That being so, they 
must be deemed to have kept it for the purpose indicated in the contract, 
that is, as liquidated damages. 
Close v. Blumenthal 354 P.2d 856, (Utah 1960), followed soon after 
McMullin. Close was the seller and Blumenthal was the defaulting buyer. The seller 
did not offer to return the $500.00 earnest money before commencing his lawsuit. 
The question presented was whether he could retain the earnest money and also get 
specific performance. The lower court granted specific performance despite the 
seller's failure to return the earnest money. The Supreme Court again reversed, as in 
Andreason, and set the judgment aside. In doing so, the Court observed that the 
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clause in question here should be strictly applied against the seller. In that case, the 
Court held as follows: 
In regard to earnest money receipts of this character, it is pertinent 
to observe that the attempt to enforce this clause of the contract is 
almost invariably against the purchaser who has been induced to sign it 
and deposit money under the impression that its forfeiture will be the 
extent of his loss if he decides to not buy the property. And the suit is 
by a seller who wants to be sure to keep the money in hand, and also 
seek additional relief. This clause is for the benefit of the seller. He will 
obviously always choose the option to his advantage and to the 
disadvantage of the buyer. Under those circumstances the clause should 
be strictly applied against the seller and he should be held to meet its 
requirements with exactness. 
The Court went on to observe that: 
It seems only fair and reasonable that where the contract provides 
that the seller may 'at his option' retain the earnest money payment as 
liquidated damages, in lieu of enforcing the contract, he should be 
required to make his choice and do one or the other, and to act 
consistently therewith. That he has his choice is enough without giving 
him the advantage of both alternatives and thus providing two strings to 
his bow. The plaintiff having kept the $500 must be deemed to have 
kept it for the purpose indicated in the contract, that is, as liquidated 
damages and is precluded from the other remedy. Close, 354 P.2d at 
857. 
The next case, Dowding v. Land Funding Limited, 555 P.2d957 (Utah 1976), 
involves a similar fact situation. The seller failed to return the earnest money, and 
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this time the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The dismissal was 
affirmed on appeal. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff, after he sued for 
damages, deposited the $200.00 earnest money with the clerk of the court. That 
action was not deemed to be a return of the earnest money to the buyer. After briefly 
reciting the facts, the Court cited to the previous three cases, ofAndreason, Mc Mull in 
,and Close as dispositive of the case. The buyer's failure to return the earnest money 
prior to suit was again fatal to the seller pursuing any other remedy. 
Finally, in Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1995), the $2,000.00 
earnest money was held by a real estate broker and not returned to the buyer prior to 
the seller's suit for damages. The trial court granted the buyer's summary judgment 
motion based on the fact that the sellers had not returned the earnest money, and 
thereby elected to retain it as liquidated damages as their exclusive remedy. The 
granting of summary judgment was affirmed, on appeal. The Court of Appeals used 
"election of remedies" language but used "condition precedent" reasoning. 
The Court of Appeals cited the previous four cases with approval, and fended 
off an argument that the election of remedies doctrine as claimed as in Angelos v. 
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First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983) was a "technical rule of 
procedure." The Court addressed the cases previously cited herein and noted that "the 
cases uniformly hold that before a seller may pursue a remedy other than liquidated 
damages, the seller must release any claim to the deposit money." 
These five cases are therefore instructive of the following principles: 
1. Failure to return the earnest money prior to suit precludes recovery by 
a disappointed seller, and the same is true whether the case is thrown out at pretrial, 
on motion, or even after judgment. 
2. Earnest money held by a third party, such as a real estate broker, or even 
the Court, is not money returned to the buyer. Money held, whether by the plaintiff, 
an agent or even the Court, is not money returned. The only way to return the earnest 
money is to give it back to the buyer. 
3. The remedies of retaining earnest money and filing suit are incompatible 
and inconsistent. If the seller attempts to hold to both remedies, he will invariably 
be left with only the earnest money as liquidated damages and his claim for equitable 
or legal damages will fail. 
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Following the above analysis, it may be said that the return of earnest money 
is a condition precedent to a suit for legal or equitable damages. By failing to meet 
the condition precedent, this suit must fail. 
The trial court correctly applied these cases to the matter before him. The 
Plaintiffs did not return the earnest money prior to filing suit and thereby forfeited 
their other claims. 
They attempted to hold on to both remedies which they clearly cannot do. At 
one point, they attempted to release it but not return it by moving to deposit the 
earnest money into court. Though they later abandoned the motion, the motion was 
clearly an attempt to hold on to both remedies, an impermissible result. 
The Plaintiffs did finally pay $2,500.00 to Defendants six months after the 
lawsuit was filed and practically on the eve of trial. However, their failure to return 
the earnest money prior to filing the suit is fatal to their claim for legal or equitable 




NO WAIVER BY THE DEFENDANTS 
A. Any purported waiver would be ineffectual 
Because of the return of the earnest money is required as a condition precedent 
to filing a suit for other relief, and because that condition precedent was not met in 
this case, a dismissal is the only alternative available. Failure to meet the condition 
precedent is fatal to the case. This is not something that can later be waived by the 
buyer, and the Court correctly so held, since the choice of liquidated damages versus 
other damages was within the purview of the sellers alone. That election can only be 
made by the action of the seller. If the sellers desire to seek equitable or legal relief, 
they may exercise that option by returning the earnest money and proceeding with 
their action. On the other hand, the failure to return the earnest money constitutes 
their election to keep it and precludes them from any other remedy. Therefore, the 
principle of waiver does not apply. The condition precedent must first be met and 
failure of Plaintiffs to meet the condition carried its own legal consequences. 
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The concept of waiver presumes some conduct or inaction on the part of the 
buyer. That is not the case here, as the choice, by contract, is strictly that of the seller 
and it is the action or inaction of the seller that determines the consequences, not 
those of the buyer. The only alternative was dismissal of the case. 
B. There was no waiver by the Defendants. 
In support of their claim of waiver, the plaintiffs raise two points. First, that 
the answer failed to raise the return of the earnest money as an affirmative defense. 
Second, that there was a stipulation to waive all objections to the timeliness of the 
return of the earnest money. The only citation to the record for these claims is the 
Findings of Fact No. 6 and 7 (R. 470) 
In fact, the pleadings show that the Defendants did raise every affirmative 
defense and expressly did not waive any of them. (See R. at 84) 
As to the claim that the Defendants entered into a stipulation on April 18th, the 
purported evidence for such is a letter of April 19, 2000, from Plaintiffs' counsel. 
That letter (R. at 380), which was never admitted into evidence, does not state that 
an agreement was reached, only that a request was made and a condition was placed 
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upon the granting of that request. The request was for a ten (10) day extension to 
oppose Plaintiffs' earlier motion to deposit earnest money into court. The fact that 
there was not an agreement to waive any objection to the failure to return the earnest 
money is shown by the following facts, which leave little or no room to believe 
otherwise. 
1. The letter does not even state that there was an agreement, only that a ten 
(10) day extension was offered, upon a condition that was not acceptable. The 
extension was not accepted with the condition placed on it, and instead, the 
Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to deposit earnest money into 
court, (R. at 116) and cited to Palmer v. Hayes, supra, for the proposition that 
payment into court does not constitute a return of the earnest money to the buyer. 
The Plaintiffs did nothing to pursue any rights under any purported stipulation, and 
in fact abandoned their motion. 
2. It makes no sense whatsoever for Defendants to concede the very point 
to which they wanted to file an opposition. 
3. No such stipulation was ever prepared or executed. 
18 
4. The earnest money was returned shortly before trial, with no stipulation 
or condition attached. 
5. The following exchanges with the Court at oral argument on the Motion 
to Dismiss demonstrate that the Court neither heard evidence nor made a finding on 
the existence of any such stipulation. The references are to the transcript of oral 
argument which is found in the record at page 516. (The transcript is not paginated 
with the rest of the Record, therefore the page references herein are to the pagination 
by the transcriber.) 
a. Page 11 Line 17: 
MR. BRADFORD: What I'm saying is that letter doesn't reflect that is 
an agreement. It says it was imposed as a condition, but not that Mr. 
[Fueston] agreed to it. 
THE COURT: What is he agreeing to. 
MR. BRADFORD: He doesn't remember. He doesn't remember the 
conversation. 
THE COURT: But by this letter it says all objections based on 
timeliness. They agree not to waive objections on timeliness? 
MR. BRADFORD: Well, timeliness could have to do with the question 
of interest, payment of interest, ongoing interest on the earnest money 
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that we otherwise would have a claim to. I think the sense of the letter 
is what you've read into it. I don't know the letter establishes that. 
There's not enough evidence in the record to take that letter as 
establishing an agreement. That may very well be what Mr. Abbott 
intended or thought. 
THE COURT: If that's true, then, if there's some ambiguity then I 
would need to have a hearing. But if you're not resting on some 
ambiguity, you're basically saying you can't waive it. 
MR. BRADFORD: That's right, and that is what I'm saying. 
THE COURT: So that's why I'm saying I don't want to mince words. 
If we're going to talk about it some other way, I mean, Mr. [Fueston] — 
MR. BRADFORD: Whatever the agreement was, whatever the 
conversation was — and I wasn't there — and whatever the letter says, 
and however Mr. Abbott intended it, my position is it was not waiveable 
after the fact. 
THE COURT: Okay. (Emphasis added) 
b. Page 23, line 13: 
MR. ABBOTT: Okay. Anyway, so they didn't bring it up in the answer. 
And then we did have the stipulation which was mentioned in the April 
19th letter. Now Mr. Bradford says that's not evidence of that. And 
we're in a difficult spot here because we've rested. I think it would be 
proper if the Court finds that it needs more evidence on that issue, to 
allow us to reopen and to put evidence forth and testimony forth on what 
the stipulation was, and what the terms of that was. 
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THE COURT: If that is the case I would, if necessary. (Emphasis 
added) 
There never was a hearing regarding the Plaintiffs' claim as to the stipulation, 
and therefore the Court had no opportunity to make findings with regard to it. 
Finally, in its ruling on November 29, 2000, the Court again addressed the 
Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants had stipulated not to raise the issue of failure to 
return the earnest money at trial. The Court had opportunity to make a finding, but 
only referred to it as Plaintiffs' argument, and not the Court's finding. 
Based on the foregoing, there is no factual basis for a finding that on April 18, 
2000, counsel for the parties entered into a stipulation. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN ORDERING THE 
EARNEST MONEY RETURNED OR CREDITED TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
In his Ruling, the trial court ordered the return of the earnest money to the 
Plaintiffs, or the amount credited against the judgment. The only justification for 
doing so was cited as the Court's "equitable powers." 
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The Court never reached the question of whether the Defendants defaulted on 
the Real Estate Purchase Contract. The pleadings spell out the Defendants' claim that 
they invoke the appraisal condition, the appraisal condition failed, and the Defendants 
were entitled to cancel the contract. (R. 84) They believe they were fully entitled to 
return of the earnest money. 
The first portion of this brief is dedicated to the proposition that if a seller 
retains the earnest money, he forfeits the right to sue. If the earnest money is not 
returned prior to filing suit, the suit should be dismissed and the Court's dismissal in 
this case was proper. 
All of that begs the question as to whether or not liquidated damages are 
justified. Though the seller may choose liquidated damages as his exclusive remedy, 
as was done here by retaining the earnest money, the buyers are entitled to deny that 
they were in default and if their default is not proven, the earnest money should be 
returned to them. 
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In this case, the Court noted that the Plaintiffs had returned the earnest money 
too late, in an abortive attempt to keep their lawsuit alive, and therefore it should now 
be returned to Plaintiffs by an Order, invoking its "equitable powers." 
It is clear error for the Court to utilize his equitable powers after hearing only 
one side of the case. Without a finding that the Defendants were in default, no 
equitable powers should deprive them of their rights. 
This Court should correct the improper use of the trial court's "equitable 
powers" under a clear error standard of review. The error is clearly prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN REDUCING 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS 
The trial court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and agreed that the 
Defendants were thus the prevailing party. However, the court reduced the attorneys 
fees drastically, ruling that the Defendants should have brought their motion earlier 
and therefore were not entitled to attorneys fees from the point at which the motion 
23 
should have been brought through the balance of the case. This Court should correct 
the clear error under a clear error standard of review. 
The trial court's ruling presupposes that an attorney should know what a judge 
would do before the judge does it. This does not conform to common experience in 
life. The legal system is unpredictable. If every judge did the right thing every time, 
there would be no need for appellate courts and there would be no reversals on 
appeal. 
In the present case, the Defendants employed an appropriate strategy in order 
to obtain a dismissal with prejudice. A dismissal at any earlier time would have left 
open a possibility that the Plaintiffs could simply re-file in an attempt to cure the fatal 
flaw that ultimately resulted in dismissal with prejudice. By waiting until the 
Plaintiffs had presented their case and rested, a dismissal with prejudice was the 
proper and intended result. That option was always available to the Plaintiffs though 
they did not avail themselves of it, and proceeded instead to try the case in its present 
posture. That course of action was within the exclusive choice of the Plaintiffs, and 
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the actions of the Defendants in waiting until the Plaintiffs had rested was 
appropriate, without any prescience as to how the judge would ultimately rule. 
Appellants' Brief contains argument to the effect that the Defendants should 
have done more than they did to warn the Plaintiffs about the consequences of their 
failure to return the earnest money. This is an odd argument indeed. It should be 
borne in mind that Defendants' counsel's primary duty is to his client and not to the 
opposing party. It is not his duty to educate opposing counsel as to his or his clients' 
procedural or tactical errors. To do so may in fact be contrary to the duty to his own 
client. To suggest that the Defendants or their counsel had some duty to warn the 
Plaintiffs or protect them from their own folly is an absurdity that hardly requires a 
response. 
The Court was correct in awarding the Defendants attorneys fees, but 
committed clear error in reducing them. 
The reduced portion of the attorneys fees were incurred in activities relating 
to the case, that is: discovery, motions, trial preparations, etc. The only factor that 
lead the Court to find those fees to be "unreasonable" is that the Motion to Dismiss 
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was not brought earlier, when a dismissal would be without prejudice. The timing 
of the motion was an appropriate strategic decision on the part of the Defendants, and 
they should not be punished by being denied of a large portion of their attorneys fees. 
To do so renders the attorney fee provision of the contract largely inoperative and 
vitiates the contract between the parties. 
SUMMARY 
This Court should hold to a long line of cases that make the return of earnest 
money a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit for damages or equitable relief in a 
real estate purchase contract. There is no amount of linguistic contortionism or 
tortured syllogisms such as those indulged in by Plaintiffs that would allow a seller 
to both retain the earnest money as liquidated damages and also file suit for additional 
damages. The contract is clear that the seller must choose. He must retain it or return 
it, he cannot do both. Nor is it a return of the earnest money to deposit into court or 
to leave it with a broker or other agent. It must be returned to the buyer as a 
condition precedent to suit, and a seller who acts otherwise fails to meet the condition 
precedent and precludes a suit for any other or additional damages. Compliance with 
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the condition precedent is entirely within the choice and conduct of the sellers, and 
no conduct or inaction by the buyers is necessary or effective to change the 
consequences of the sellers' choice. 
The trial court cannot invoke equitable powers without hearing both sides of 
the story, and weighing the equities on both sides. The trial court's order to credit the 
earnest money back to Plaintiffs, under the Court's "equitable powers," should be 
reversed as clear and prejudicial error. 
A dismissal after full presentation of the Plaintiffs' case is necessarily a 
dismissal with prejudice. It was appropriate for the Defendants to obtain a dismissal 
with prejudice to truncate the trial and to forestall a re-filing. The Court committed 
clear error by awarding only the attorneys fees incurred up to the earliest time the 
Motion to Dismiss could have been filed. Requiring an attorney to second guess a 
judge's future actions in terms of professional judgment and strategy and handling 
of litigation is not within the purview of our legal system, imperfect as it is. 
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The dismissal was necessarily with prejudice, since the Plaintiffs had presented 
their evidence and had rested. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 2001 
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